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The article critically analyzes the perception on the incompatibility of the 
Filipino self-understanding as kapwa with Habermas’s notion of 
argumentative discourse that champions autonomy and individuality. It 
argues that this apparent incompatibility is more due to the absence of an 
imagination of non-Western forms of rationalization processes and 
reflexivity, than to the commonly held claim of the incommensurability of 
lifeworlds. The key to this imagination is to locate potential rationalization 
processes from within modes of communication that reinforce kapwa 
solidarity. In the end, the article shows that kwentuhan, which is the mode 
of communication that is integrated with kapwa solidarity, contains 
enabling components for reflexivity, and thereby makes individuals more 
open and receptive to the process of argumentation as a rational and 




t the center of Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory is an 
elaboration of argumentation as “an exemplary local 
embodiment” of the most inclusive discourse.1 Argumentation, as 
the most reflexive form of giving and taking reasons among 
communicative participants, operates on “unavoidably assumed” 
components: first, that the participants understand themselves as 
autonomous (the authors of their own positions); second, that the 
process is directed towards an unforced agreement. These comprise 
                                                 
1  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions To a Discourse 
Theory of Law And Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
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the presupposition of equality or symmetry among individuals.2 
While other communication modes of exchanging reasons also rest 
on the presupposition of equality, Habermas insists that it is in 
argumentative mode of communication that these become more 
explicit. Rational argumentation operates as a process of resolving 
conflicts where participants are temporarily abstracted from the 
particular solidarities of family, neighborhood, city or state. 
3Argumentation constitutes the dialectical link for his notions of 
justice and solidarity,4 and serves as the main component of his 
deliberative theory of democracy.5  
Some aspects of argumentation, however, are believed to 
have developed from Western contexts and thus bring doubt to its 
applicability in communitarian lifeworlds in Asia and other 
regions. Habermas earlier responded to such doubts by referring to 
his theory of societal evolution, and its homologies with the 
development of ego-identities. 6  In this response, Habermas 
explains that social integration in all societies follow an internal 
                                                 
2  Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. 
Christian Lenhardt, et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990a), 154. 
3 Ibid., 244. 
4 Jürgen Habermas, “Justice And Solidarity: On The Discussion Concerning 
Stage 6,” in The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion Between Philosophy 
and the Social Sciences, ed.Thomas Wren et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990b), 
224-254 ; A more elaborate discussion on the dialectical relation between justice 
and solidarity through discourse or argumentation can be found in his later essay, 
“A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality,” in The Inclusion 
of The Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Ciaran Cronin et al. (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1998), 29-46.   
5 Jürgen Habermas,  Between Facts and Norms, 110, 460. 
6 Jürgen Habermas, “Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism” in 
Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: 
Beacon, 1979), 95 -129. Habermas focuses here on general patterns of 
rationalization in societies. In another essay within the same volume, “Moral 
Development and Ego-identity,” 69-94, and in later essays, he elaborates on 
general patterns of rationalization from the perspective of the development of 
lifeworld members into autonomous individuals. See “Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action,” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 116-
194, and in “Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s 
Theory of Subjectivity,” in Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. 
William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 149-204.  




logic of rationalization, which becomes manifest in historically 
varied ways, but nonetheless follows the same pattern of moving 
towards more reflexive levels of integration. Habermas thus argues 
against the claimed incompatibility between the Western paradigm 
of individualism and the non-Western communitarians, by 
showing that their apparent irreconcilability is merely a case of two 
different lifeworlds looking at each other from different stages of 
one singular dimension of rationalization processes. 7  Recently, 
Habermas’s position took on a subtle shift. Rather than setting out 
to level down their differences, he now acknowledges that the West, 
being the  origin of the development of capitalism and thereby the 
first to learn of its perils, is  more receptive to the idea of human 
rights based on equality and autonomy because of its  cultural 
history. The non-West’s learning, meanwhile was “accelerated and 
violent,” precisely due to the imposition of Western economic 
organization of capitalism on its shores. 8  Habermas thus 
acknowledges that the idea of human rights, which champions 
autonomy and individuality, coincided with the development of 
Western capitalism. He nonetheless argues that because the 
capitalist organization of economy has become ever more global, 
there is a general imperative on everyone to adapt accordingly.  
I would like to highlight this subtle shift in Habermas’s 
position and the implications it bears regarding the compatibility 
of argumentation with all cultural lifeworlds, as it rests on the 
assumption of the autonomy of its individual participants. This 
question touches on the peculiarity of the place of argumentation 
in the Philippine setting, being one of the “more Western” 
developing countries in Asia because of its colonial history. As with 
many postcolonial societies, Philippine society had to walk through 
a fragmented understanding of modernization where institutions 
of politics and economy have been imposed from without, while 
the traditional lifeworlds tread through patchy and dead-end roads 
in their attempts to achieve more reflexive self-understanding. 
                                                 
7 Jürgen Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas, 
ed. Peter Dews (London: Verso, 1986), 169.  
8 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, trans. Max 
Pensky (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 126.   




From the outset, the present continuous clash between modern 
systems and the people’s clinging to traditional norms and their 
collective identities signals the Filipinos’ rejection of rationalization 
and modernization processes as a whole. In this essay, I offer a 
perspective for understanding this apparent “refusal” towards 
rationalization. I argue here that the rejection should be more 
attributed to the absence of an imagination of rationalization 
processes other than its configuration in the West, than to the 
incommensurability of the Western and non-Western lifeworlds. I 
argue here that Habermas’s model of inclusive conflict resolution 
through argumentation can be made compatible with Filipino 
sensibilities only if the central components of reflexivity and 
autonomy are developed from within their own characteristic 
linguistic processes.  I assume here with Habermas that the 
development into autonomous individuals is not insurmountable, 
however gradual it may be.  This paper is thus a work in the 
fringes of an attempt to sketch out possible forms of adaptation of 
the Western rational form of argumentation into the Philippine 
context. In section one, I will discuss the constellation of modes of 
communication that resembles and contrasts with Habermas’s 
notion of argumentation, and why in the present context, it is 
difficult for Habermas’s notion of argumentation to take root in 
Philippine soil. In section two, I will elaborate on Habermas’s 
possible responses to this alleged incompatibility. Finally, I will 
show in section three how the local modes of everyday 
communication in the Philippines can bring about moments of 
reflexivity and thereby enable individuals to engage in 
“argumentation” which champions reflexivity and inclusiveness 
without the high price of compromising the thick sense of solidarity 





It is difficult to find an exact translation of Habermas’s 
conception of argumentation in the Philippine national language 
(Filipino). Rather than a single term, the closest equivalent would 
be a constellation of modes of communication related to 
ARGUMENTATION IN THE PHILIPPINE LANGUAGE: 
NAGTATALO, NAG-AAWAY, NAG-UUSAP




argumentation. In what follows, I provide a descriptive account of 
each of the following modes of communication as used in the 
everyday Philippine context: nagtatalo (A1), nag-aaway (A2), nag-
uusap (A3).9 
Argumentation in the Philippine context is commonly 
translated in Filipino as nagtatalo, which literally means the state of 
rational verbal competition over something. It is a lively exchange 
of reasons. Defined as such, A1 bears a resemblance with 
Habermas’s conception of argumentation—as a competition, a 
“practice of giving and taking reasons, a “game” with rules.”10 The 
rules of nagtatalo are generally assumed as follows: 1) it is a friendly 
competition, as such the relationships of symmetry in friendship is 
presupposed; 2) the subject of argumentation can be about 
anything—sports, ideas, news, politics—that does not directly touch 
on one’s personal issues, claims or needs. Thus, a characteristic of 
nagtatalo as argumentation is the aspect of detachment among 
interlocutors. Such a detachment is evident in their ability to banter 
and tease each other while arguing, a salient move to ward off the 
tension that a competition can bring.  
Nagtatalo should be understood as encompassed within the 
broader mode of communication of kwentuhan. Kwentuhan is often 
translated as “conversation,”11 but literally means “story-telling” or 
the exchange of stories. Sometimes when having a conversation, 
Filipinos would simply describe themselves as “nag-kukwentuhan.” 
This common mode of communication has such a binding power 
that it permeates the everyday life of the ordinary Filipino. 12 
                                                 
9  Other terms used are more of appropriations from colonial languages. 
Nagdidiskusyon is an appropriation from the Spanish discusíon, which is normally 
used in formal occasions. Also used is nagde-debate which is obviously the Filipino 
appropriation of the English term debate.  
10 Jürgen Habermas, “Concluding Comments on Empirical Approaches to 
Deliberative Politics," Acta Politica 40, no. 3 (2005): 385. 
11 Kwentuhan “can both mean conversation and story-telling” or conversation 
that “can include a lot of story-telling.” See Ma. Marilou Ibita, “A Conversation 
with the Story of the Lord’s Supper in 1 Corinthians 11:17-34; Engaging the 
Scripture Text and the Filipino Christians' Context,” in 1 and 2 Corinthians, ed. Y 
S Kim. (MN: Fortress Press). 
12 Ibid.  




Kwentuhan is one of the most effective means of social bonding in 
the Philippines. It is within this setting where we can say 
argumentation as A1 is set in a relatively comfortable situation. The 
place of A1 within the context of kwentuhan gives sense to the 
expression, “Hindi kami nag-aaway. Nagtatalo lang.” (We are not 
fighting. We are just arguing). There is the thick social bond of 
community that underlies kwentuhan, so that as soon as 
argumentation is taken out of this context, it is no longer 
considered as nagtatalo, but as nag-aaway (A2).  
Nag-aaway literally means “fighting,” either exclusively 
through the exchange of abusive words or the use of violence, or 
both. Argumentation as A2 resembles Habermas’s notion of 
argumentation as it is also a mode of raising real claims based on 
interests, and involves criticizing the validity claims of others. Once 
argumentation involves real claims, the exchange becomes more 
serious and cuts through a more personal level. There is a strong 
tendency towards violence present in A2. Since the conflict that 
arises in A2 marks a severing from the interpersonal bond of 
kwentuhan, the resolution of the conflict would need the solidarity-
forging power of a mediator. Under the presence of the mediator, 
the communicative mode among parties becomes the calm 
exchange called nag-uusap (A3).  
A3 is translated as “conversation” but takes on a more 
serious tone, in contrast with the congenial and lively tone that 
characterizes kwentuhan. A3 is especially used in situations involving 
processes of coming to agreement — “Pag-usapan natin ‘to.” (“Let’s 
talk about this” or “Let’s agree on this”). The resemblance of A3 
with Habermas’s argumentation is found in this feature of coming 
to an agreement. Among the three, it is the second and third 
notions of argumentation which are most politically relevant. 
Taken together, A2 and A3 comprise the political process of 
conflict resolution.  
The most noted feature of Filipino conflict resolution is 
the need for the authority of mediation. This is not to say that the 
Habermasian notion of argumentation as a formal procedure of 
consensus formation has not yet been institutionalized in 
Philippine society. It is, in principle, the mode of communication 




used by institutions for procedures of justification such as those in 
the legislative branch of the government. Nonetheless, the use of 
mediation “as a means of avoiding state legal institutions” in 
Philippine society remains widespread. 13  For a more focused 
analysis on this, I turn to the documented account of a widely 
applied (informal) justice system among the rural poor: the 
Barangay Justice System (BJS). I highlight here the reasons offered 
by the analysts for the rural poor’s preference for BJS over formal 
institutions in resolving their disputes.14  
In the landscape of Philippine politics, the barangay was 
designated as the lowest unit of state control by then President 
Ferdinand Marcos during the martial law regime in the 1970s. This 
was partly done in order to “rationalize and to bring under state 
control” the folk or indigenous system of conflict resolution.15 The 
“procedure” used in the BJS varies and has developed through time. 
What has remained unchanged, which is also why it is gaining 
popular assent today, is its wide accessibility to the masses and its 
promise for a quick remedy for divisions within the community.16 
Although the BJS has been placed in contradistinction with the 
formal system of procedures in the judiciary court, it nonetheless 
has an element of order in it. This is evident in the way the 
procedure unfolds, which begins with the complainant and 
respondent being called to a hearing that usually culminates in an 
“amicable settlement” among parties through the authority of the 
mediator. The procedure concludes with a “ritual” of 
reconciliation. 17 
                                                 
13  Sidney Silliman, "A Political Analysis of the Philippines' Katarungang 
Pambarangay System of Informal Justice through Mediation," Law and Society 
Review, 19 (1985), 279-301.  
14 Ibid. See also Kit G. Machado, "Politics and Dispute-Processing in the 
Rural Philippines," Pacific Affairs,  52 (1979), 294-314; and Jennifer C. Franco,  
"Peripheral Justice? Rethinking Justice Sector Reform in the Philippines," World 
Development 36 (2008), 1858-1873. 
15 Sidney Silliman, “A Political Analysis…,” 284. 
16 Kit Machado, “Politics and Dispute-Processing…,” 301. 
17 Sidney Silliman, “A Political Analysis…,” 292. 




From the perspective of the state, the institutionalization 
of the BJS was a mechanism for rationalizing political power by 
“reducing the significance of local elites” and channeling power to 
local leaders legitimized by state law.18 From the perspective of the 
masses, however, the legitimacy of the state’s institutionalization of 
power through the BJS was viewed differently. Silliman observed 
that the villagers were supportive of BJS because it was perceived as 
a continuation of the shared traditional norm which upheld “key 
values and beliefs” of their collective identity. For the villagers in 
the Visayas region, for instance, the BJS was treated as husay which 
meant "hearing" or a "settling of accounts,” which as an adjective 
that also means "orderly," "without confusion," or "well arranged 
with everything put in its place." Husay is also associated with hilot, 
which means “healing.”(Is this the correct translation of hilot?) The 
perception of the BJS as a procedure of “healing” thus implies  that 
the villagers view conflict as a form of injury or wound to the 
collective order that needed healing.  
In contrast to the BJS, the higher and more formal justice 
systems were regarded as ineffective in handling broken social 
relationships. For instance, the rural poor in the Tagalog region, 
according to Machado, perceive the formal legal system as that 
which “exacerbates conflict and increases the likelihood of 
violence.” 19  With this general perception, it was likely that the 
people turned to the BJS more than to the higher courts for settling 
disputes. Machado significantly notes that this trend among the 
rural poor includes criminal cases, which, by law, should be directly 
handled by the higher courts. According to Machado’s analysis,   
 
“The transplanted Western legal assumption that 
the public is an aggrieved party when certain acts, 
defined as criminal, are committed is not widely 
shared by Filipinos. Such acts tend to be viewed as 
private matters between the parties and their 
families. In rural communities where Filipinos have 
many-faceted, long-enduring relationships with 
their neighbors, many of whom may be relatives; 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 286.  
19 Kit Machado, “Politics and Dispute-Processing…,” 301. 




there is a presumption in favor of compromise and 
reconciliation rather than further disruption of a 
personal and community relationships by active 
prosecution of criminal complaint. Many Filipinos, 
lacking economic security, are usually more 
concerned about recovering damages than about 
vindicating an abstract public claim against a 
wrongdoer.” 20 
 
I would like to highlight here what  Machado points out as 
the schism within the formal justice system of the Philippines, 
which is created by the “transplanted” assumption of individual 
rights and from the colonial West (Spain and U.S) that runs in 
tension with the traditional/ indigenous core values of prioritizing 
interpersonal relations in the Philippines. Silliman shares this claim 
when he shows the conflicting attitudes towards the BJS between 
the institutional level and the grassroots level. The commonality in 
Machado’s and Silliman’s analyses can be attributed to their 
dependence on the analysis of the American sociologist Frank 
Lynch. Lynch is known to have placed the core of Filipino identity 
on the high value given to “smooth interpersonal relations” (SIR). 
SIR, according to Lynch, explains the behavioral pattern of 
avoidance among Filipinos when it comes to confrontational 
interactions. This supports Machado and Silliman’s observation of 
their subjects who mostly disfavored formal court procedures as 
these were detrimental to SIR.  
Lynch’s SIR approach to explaining Filipino social 
behavior was, however, criticized by local scholars for its “positivist 
and functionalist preoccupation.”21 It was criticized as “colonial” in 
perspective22 because it reinforces a mistaken impression that the 
social behavioral pattern of Filipinos “leaves no room for atypical 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 300. 
21 Victor T. King, Sociology of South-East Asia: Transformations in a Developing 
Region. Vol.3. (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008): 28. 
22  Niels Mulder, "The Crux Is the Skin: Reflections on Southeast Asian 
Personhood,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30 (2011): 100.  




challenges to the social order.23 Filipino behavior explained this 
way presents SIR less as a value and more as a “syndrome” of 
passivity that also translates into complicity. 24  Mendoza and 
Perkinson argue that the Western framework used for this long-
held observation subjects it to unfair normative evaluations. It 
paints the Filipino’s consistent concern for social relations and 
group harmony as a “trivial pursuit” which is “counterproductive.”  
 An alternative to the analysis of SIR can be found in the 
initiative of Virigilio Enriquez and the nationalist research program 
of Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino psychology). 25  According to 
Enriquez, a better approach to understanding Filipino behavior is 
to look into the resources of the Filipino (Tagalog) language. In this 
approach, kapwa, as a concept for social relations is posited as an 
alternative core value to SIR. Whereas the latter projects a 
superficial and functionalist view of social relations, the former 
implies how the value of social relations is embedded in one’s very 
own self-understanding: 
Kapwa literally means “fellow-being” or “both,” as in 
“Kapwa silang mabait” (They are both good). As the 
“superordinate concept” of social understanding, 
kapwa is captured, but exceeds, the sense of the 
English “other”.  
“In English the word “others” is actually used in the 
opposition to the “self,” and implies the recognition 
of the self as a separate identity. In contrast, kapwa 
is recognition of a shared identity.” 26  
                                                 
23 Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the 
Philippines, 1840-1910 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), 
12.  
24 Lily S. Mendoza, et al., “Filipino ‘Kapwa’ in Global Dialogue: A Different 
Politics of Being-With the  ‘Other’,” Intercultural Communication Studies 12 (2003): 
186 
25  Virgilio G. Enriquez, "Kapwa: A Core Concept in Filipino Social 
Psychology," Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review 42 (1978): 100-108. 
26Ibid., 102. 




To understand this better, one must comprehend the 
designated Filipino notion of the self — loob, “where the true worth 
of a person lies.”27 Loob, literally is a spatial concept that means 
“inside.” The Filipino who refers to her inner self as “kalooban” is 
referring to a metaphysical space. Yet the spatial connotation is also 
misleading, for it denotes delineated boundaries of the inner self, 
as if to convey a clear sense of individuality. Filipino psychologist 
Jaime Bulatao, explains loob by way of comparison with the 
Northern Americans’ sense of individuality. He claims that 
Filipinos are like “so many fried eggs in a pan whose experience of 
the self consists of a ‘core’ (the yolk) but with the outer core (the 
egg white) blurring into/with the outer core of other eggs in a 
coterminous fashion.” By contrast, Americans are like “hard-boiled 
eggs whose individual shells protect their autonomy and who then 
exercise the option to either open themselves (or part of themselves) 
to others or not at all.”28 It is not very clear what the ‘core of the 
self’ means here and how it is distinguished from other selves. What 
is important for our purpose is the general agreement among the 
sociologists and psychologists at that time on the Filipino sense of 
self which was heavily entangled with collective identity.  
The unclear delineation of the Filipino sense of 
individuality makes the concept kapwa more comprehensible as a 
notion that accommodates both the self and the other. When one 
refers to another as her kapwa, it implies “an awareness of shared 
identity.” According to Enriquez, “Once ako (ego) starts thinking of 
him/herself as different from kapwa, the self, in effect denies the 
status of kapwa to the other.” For Enriquez and the proponents of 
Sikolohiyang Pilipino, kapwa is the defining concept of the Filipino 
self-understanding. 29  It is also regarded as the person’s utmost 
                                                 
27 Reynaldo C. Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution, 20. 
28 Lily S. Mendoza, “Filipino ‘Kapwa’ in Global Dialogue…,” 288. 
29 Ibid., See also Katrin De Guia,  Kapwa: The Self in the Other: Worldviews and 
Lifestyles of Filipino Culture-bearers (Quezon City: Anvil Pub., 2005).; Rogelia Pe
Pua, et al., "Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino psychology): A legacy of Virgilio G. 
Enriquez," Asian Journal of Social Psychology 3 (2000): 49-71.;  and Ibana, Rainier A. 
"Grafting Philosophy to the Tagalog Prefix Ka," Kritika Kultura 12 (2009): 27-60. 




expression of being human (tao). Enriquez explains this in the 
negative sense:  
 
“One argument for the greater importance of kapwa 
in Filipino thought and behavior is the shock or 
disbelief that the Filipino registers when confronted 
with one who is supposedly walang kapwa (-tao) [no 
sense of kapwa]. If one is walang pakisama [having no 
ability to get along], others might still say, “He would 
eventually learn” or “Let him be; that’s his 
prerogative.” If one is walang hiya [no shame], others 
say, “His parents should teach him a thing or two.” 
If one is walang utang na loob [no debt of gratitude] 
others might advise, “Avoid him.” But if one is 
walang kapwa tao [no sense of kapwa], people say, 
“He must have reached rock bottom. Napakasama 
na niya. He is the worst.30 ”  
 
If we follow the logic of kapwa and loob, one can extract a 
more comprehensive account for the Filipinos’ view of social 
conflict and their constant need for mediation processes. To a 
certain extent, informal procedures of conflict regulation such as 
the BJS preserve the continuity of kapwa relation and the integrity 
of the loob. The same is true for the three common views on 
argumentation: nagtatalo, nag-aaway, and nag-uusap. A conflict is 
generally perceived as an abstraction from kapwa relations, but 
since the ego or loob is thickly connected to kapwa relations, the 
abstraction is perceived as injurious to one’s person. This is why for 
many Filipinos a kapwa approach to social relations makes them 
more responsive, while the reverse makes them feel alienated. An 
example for this is their personalistic form of politics. If we accept 
this alternative explanation, then we are more prepared to 
understand that the lack of predisposition towards formal 
procedures of argumentation bears a more fundamental issue—the 
issue regarding one’s very own sense of self.  
 
 
                                                 
30 Virgilio G. Enriquez, "Kapwa: A Core Concept…,” 11. 







My above excursion into the underlying social psychology 
on the Filipino norm on conflict resolution should not be 
misconstrued as reinforcing what has been noted as an 
oversimplified dichotomy between “Western individualism” and 
“Asian communitarianism.”31 To many Western thinkers and their 
critics, this dichotomy turns issues regarding individual human 
rights as irresolvable due to the incommensurability of cultural 
horizons. Habermas is one to strongly argue against this by first 
pointing out that there is no real dilemma between them. Drawing 
from his individuation through socialization thesis, he asserts that 
individualism and communitarianism can be viewed in a dialectical 
tension.32 This thesis, which he draws from George Herbert Mead, 
explains the ontogenesis of ego-identities through progressive stages 
of socialization. The most advanced among these stages consist of 
socialization processes through the use of critical and reflexive 
communicative exchanges, namely, argumentation. Individuals 
socialized or steeped in argumentative settings develop post 
conventional ego identities.33 The dialectical relationship between 
communitarianism and individualism, based on this thesis, can be 
portrayed as the different stages in which the tension between 
individual interests and the collective interests of the community is 
worked out towards equilibrium. For instance, in the conventional 
stage of socialization, the collective interest prevails over the 
individual’s desires and intentions; whereas in the post 
conventional stage, the individual is caught in a dialectical struggle 
with the collective. This struggle, however, can be a productive one 
as long as tensions are worked out through linguistic processes such 
as rational argumentation. Put in roughly simplistic terms, 
Habermas’s individuation through socialization thesis argues that 
                                                 
31 Fernando N. Zialcita, “The Meanings of Community,” Philippine Studies 44 
(1996): 33-34. 
32  Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. William 
Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1992), 126.  
33Ibid., 188-193.  
HABERMAS ON ASIAN COMMUNITARIANS
AND THE DEFENSE OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS




the more individuals engage in discursive processes of resolving 
disagreements, the more they develop their ego-identities. At the 
same time, communities become ever more inclusive and 
progressive in the post conventional stage of individuation as 
individuals become more critical of the limits of their traditional 
mentalities and open towards other ways of thinking.  
The individuation through socialization thesis, in relation 
to Asian communitarianism in its extreme form, puts forward the 
claim that a pure collective sense of self without individual ego-
identities is untenable for as long as the socialization processes in 
which members of the community are developed consist in the use 
of linguistic processes. The same can be said of Western 
individualism in its extreme form.  As Habermas noted, there can 
be no such thing as possessive individualism because the sources of 
one’s ego-identity are intricately linked with socialization 
processes.34 This is not to deny, however, that there are gradations 
in the individuation process such that some societies have higher 
levels of individualism than with others. For Habermas the 
difference can be attributed to the advance in levels of 
communication in some societies. For Habermas, the more 
reflexive communication in a society becomes, the more the society 
is able to produce autonomous ego-identities.35 At the same time, 
the more individuals grow into innovative pacemakers, the more 
possible it is for their society to advance through the work of 
creative political struggles.36 Viewed in linguistic terms, high levels 
of reflexivity in socialization processes are seen to be embodied in 
argumentation processes.  
If Habermas were to relate this thesis to the Filipino notion 
of loob, he would say that individuation of this diffused subjectivity 
is in progress for as long as it maintains a dialectical tension with 
kapwa. Thus a crucial step for its advance in development is a 
                                                 
34 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation,126. 
35Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 160-170. 
36 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory Of Communicative Action, Vol.2: Lifeworld And 
System. A Critique Of Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: 
Beacon, 1989): 168.  See also Postmetaphysical Thinking, 180.   




moment of self-problematization, specifically in the form of an 
identity crisis that would release the ego’s spontaneity towards 
creativity.37 Conflicts that arise among community members can be 
viewed as productive disruption in this sense. They can be 
considered as momentary displacements of individuals from their 
entanglements in the kapwa relations, which would in turn provide 
openings for reflexivity and critical thinking. Hence, Habermas 
would then remark that to view conflicts in communities as gaps 
that need to be filled in by the mediator (healer) would be to miss 
out on the opportunity for growth among the individuals and in 
the collective whole. Nonetheless, the impetus for growth and 
reflexivity should develop from within the community, and cannot 
be forced from outside. It is from this idea of immanence where 
Habermas concludes that the modernization processes in the post-
colonial or non-Western communities have been violently 
accelerated.   
But the problem with Habermas’s individuation through 
socialization thesis is that it does not elaborate enough on these 
historical differences. Ilan Kapoor points out that Habermas’s 
account of modernization, which includes the development of 
reflexive societies and autonomous ego-identities “so neatly 
coincided with Western historical development.”38  
Hence, the question arises on how we are to account for 
the socialization of individuals immersed in a society whose 
establishment of modern institutions did not coincide with its 
rationalization process. This question comes from the perspective 
of the Habermasian reading of modernization as a process “in 
which social systems, generated from out a traditional lifeworld, 
become increasingly complex, while the lifeworld becomes 
increasingly rationalized.” Such dual process must be understood 
as “an intricately intertwined transformation.39 Clearly, this kind of 
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modernization is not what happened in the colonial history of the 
Philippines. The systems did not grow out of the rationalization of 
their traditional lifeworlds but were colonially imposed. At the 
same time, lifeworld members had to cope with a rationalization 
process impelled by an educational system that was not well 
integrated with their everyday lives.  From the educated elite’s point 
of view, however, this stunted rationalization process is often 
attributed to poor access to universal education. 40  Such a 
statement, however, obscures the point that even education was 
used as a mechanism for colonization. 41  The question is not 
whether Filipinos have been educated, but whether or not they 
have been educated so that their society can come to examine itself.  
How then can the Filipino society imagine rationalization 
processes as developing from within their own lifeworld? The 
project of the historian Reynaldo Ileto points to this direction: an 
elaboration of conceptual tools that would help in understanding 
the historical development of Philippine society from below. Ileto’s 
achievement was to bring about an understanding of the revolt of 
the masses beyond the dichotomy made between the Enlightened 
revolution led by the intelligentsia and the so-called small reactive 
revolution of the masses.42 This project in some respects coincided 
with the research program of Sikolohiyang Pilipino,43 which we 
discussed in the previous section. It is against the backdrop of these 
initiatives where I shall sketch in the last section some areas where 
reflexivity can develop out of everyday communicative processes. 
Before I proceed, however, I would like to take up a compelling 
problem that challenges rationalization processes as illustrated in 
the following example.  
Another dimension of Philippine politics is revealed in a 
more recent analysis of the BJS. According to Jennifer Franco, the 
BJS remains to be widely used for processing disputes to this day, 
but is largely used for cases among the poor. There is no recorded 
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case; however, that involves conflicts between the poor and the 
“influential,” such as that of a landowner and a tenant. These cases 
are rather filed in the higher courts, where the poor are sidelined 
and harassed because of the amount of influence their opponents 
exert on the court officials. Furthermore, Franco noted that some 
mediators in the BJS are known to side with the powerful when it 
comes to endorsing or rejecting cases to be brought to the higher 
court.44  
What is shown in this example is a clash between 
traditional norms of social integration and the formal processes of 
integration through the force of positive law. The former 
presupposes non-autonomous individuals turning to mediators 
whose authority are legitimated by tradition. The latter presupposes 
autonomous individuals who view themselves as equal before the 
law, and turn to the integrative force of the law for the resolution 
of conflicts.  The clash between two forms of social integration 
illustrates a point Habermas raises in his engagement with Asian 
communitarian leaders who perceive the legitimation of laws 
through human rights as incompatible with their political ethos. 
According to Habermas, these leaders’ rejection somewhat raises 
the suspicion against them who have mostly stayed in power 
through non-democratic means. The problem with their rejection 
of the calls for legitimation based on human rights is that it runs 
incompatible with their acceptance of the benefits of modern 
capitalism. Habermas argues that these leaders cannot, on the one 
hand, participate in this ever more global economic system, and, 
on the other hand, reject its presuppositions of autonomy and 
equality. After all, capitalism and its universalistic orientation of 
freedom and equality, was the impetus that has led to the 
development of positive law. Hence, to welcome the system of 
capitalism in one’s traditional lifeworld is to implicitly accept its 
presuppositions of upholding individual freedom and equality.    
Habermas, thus, argues that the notion of individual 
human rights contained within the logic of capitalist systems must 
be viewed in a functionalist sense as opposed to its metaphysical 
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interpretation that heavily draws on Western culture.  He points 
out that the institutionalization of human rights through positive 
laws in the West was a mechanism for responding to the inevitable 
harmful consequences of capitalism. Hence, it was a necessary 
counterpart of the modern economic system. Habermas admits, 
however, that autonomy and equality, properties that constitute the 
institutionalization of human rights, arose out of processes of 
reflexivity in the West. Furthermore, he acknowledges that reflexive 
distance from tradition is indeed an “advantage” of occidental 
rationalism.45 Finally, he is well aware that the establishment of 
capitalism and a systematized politics in the non-Western 
developing countries has indeed been unjustly imposed.46  
Considering all these, it becomes understandable that 
modernization and rationalization processes in postcolonial 
societies like the Philippines tread on a more complicated path. Yet, 
as Habermas would argue, Philippine society cannot ride on the 
benefits of the capitalist system and simultaneously reject its 
presuppositions. Habermas would then propose that the alternative 
to stubborn rejection would be the “adaptation” of traditional 
forms of social integration towards capitalism’s “hard-to-resist’ 
imperatives.  
He offers here a guiding insight for grappling with the 
schism between the imposed western system of economics and 
political administration, on the one hand, and the lifeworld 
contexts of the Philippines, on the other hand.  In the example I 
have last noted, we have seen that the schism between the formal 
system of conflict resolution and the traditional mode of social 
integration is more or less encouraged in order to perpetuate the 
interests of the powerful in impending the rational development of 
the poor. Based on Habermas’s functionalistic understanding of 
human rights, one can counter this tendency by freeing up the 
rationalization processes that are latent within the traditional 
lifeworlds.  Adaptation can only begin when traditional norms are 
self-examined through the displacement and astonishment brought 
about by what is foreign and “new”. But how is this possible 
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without completely drying up the sources of kapwa-solidarity on 
which the identities of lifeworld members stand? The key is to 
locate rationalization processes within the very mode of 




In my analysis of the constellation of three modes of 
communication pertaining to argumentation, I have shown that 
the first mode, nagtatalo (A1) is the closest to Habermas’s idea of an 
argumentation process—it has the structure of a competition or a 
game of reasons, and it presupposes equality or symmetry among 
participants. This is opposed to nag-aaway (A2), which as we have 
said can be a violent struggle of power. The competition in A1often 
does not pertain to a real conflict, and the process of reaching 
understanding is not a real concern. These two components, as we 
have shown, only appear in A2. Meanwhile A2, as we have also 
shown, is distinguished from Habermas’s argumentation through 
the absence of a presupposition of mutual recognition of autonomy 
among participants. As such the power struggle can only come to a 
stalemate through a mediating authority. The shift from “game” 
mode to real power struggle is explained by the abstraction from 
the context of kwentuhan, a shift that signals an abstraction from 
thicker forms of solidarity.  
If the separation from the binding context of kwentuhan 
leads to the development of a more abstract sense of solidarity, then 
A2 can take on the referred to features of idealizations of 
argumentation among “members of a community of world citizens” 
bound by human rights.  What would then make argumentation in 
the Philippine context approximate Habermas’s idealization? As in 
all forms of argumentation, there must be an institutionalization of 
the idealizations presupposed within the very structure of 
argumentation. What Habermas means here is that there are 
idealizations we unavoidably make whenever we engage in 
argumentation. One of these idealizations is the reciprocal 
recognition of symmetry among participants. The 
NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AS ENABLING 
ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSR




institutionalization of this presupposition is already expressed in 
the idea of human rights backed by positive law. This 
institutionalization, however, need not be perceived as something 
that is externally imposed on the lifeworld of Philippine society.  
Just as we understand other forms of abstraction, the 
institutionalization of the recognition of individual freedom and 
equality can be viewed as the extension of the presuppositions of 
symmetry from friendships, towards a more inclusive, albeit 
abstract, community.  
The problem therefore that underlies the apparent 
incompatibility between Habermas’s notion of argumentation 
processes and the Filipino mode of conflict resolution is a solidarity 
issue. Argumentation processes are based on an abstract, legal sense 
of solidarity, whereas the Filipino mode of conflict resolution banks 
on the thicker forms of solidarity within traditional communities. 
Habermas argues that a thicker sense of solidarity is “neither 
possible nor necessary” in the level of global legal community. 47 If 
we relate this to his discourse theory, he would say that the thicker 
bonds among participants in argumentation could hardly be 
maintained in the process, and need not be (what? Or, are not 
needed?). If we are to prevent real conflicts to turn into violent ones 
(A2), then one will just have to take up the painful process of 
detachment from thicker forms of solidarity and count on the 
binding force of positive law to ensure that the resolution of 
conflicts are made against the framework of equal treatment and 
reciprocal recognition of human rights.  
Doubtless that this process would be unavoidably difficult, 
it is important to imagine ways in which the  momentary 
abstraction from the kapwa sense of solidarity  can be made 
bearable for the traditional Filipino. As we recall, it is not only the 
thick interpersonal relations which are at stake in the resolution of 
conflict through argumentation, but also the lifeworld member’s 
sense of self.  Hence, we must ask, in what ways can a participant 
in a traditional lifeworld come to terms with her capacity to author 
her “yes” or “no” positions in argumentation?  
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One approach would be to complement argumentative 
discourse with another mode of communication that is close to 
Filipino sensibilities — the narrative mode of discourse or 
kwentuhan. I have not yet underscored enough how kwentuhan 
defines the everyday life of the Filipino. One evidently sees this in 
the physiognomy of a Filipino neighborhood as carved to 
accommodate kwentuhan. For instance, one would find benches in 
front of mini-grocery shops called sari-sari stores where buyers can 
sit, greet and exchange stories with other random buyers. A 
common sight in old houses in the provincial areas is a porch where 
neighbors can sit together and trade stories during the idle time of 
the day, or drink together in the evening. Media technology has 
been appropriated for this mode of communication as well, such 
that the country has become well known as the “text-messaging 
capital of the world”. Furthermore, popular radio and television 
networks adopt the kwentuhan mode of news casting because it is 
viewed as an effective way of drawing audiences. Kwentuhan is such 
an integral part of the Filipino social life that it would not be odd 
to find strangers in a long bus ride exchanging stories about their 
lives even before they introduce each other’s names.  
If kwentuhan defines the fabric of the social Filipino’s life, 
it might very well be the best starting point to develop more 
reflexive modes of communication. Iris Marion Young’s reflections 
on inclusive political communication, has highlighted some ways 
in which this can be possible. Narrative discourses, according to 
Young, serve as supplements to argumentation because they have 
the function of illustrating, describing, or justifying a point made 
in discussions. 48  They have the potential of “enlarging the 
imagination” of listeners, and thus enabling a more cooperative 
process of reaching agreement. Moreover, it has a less constraining 
advantage over argumentation because it provides more means for 
the untrained marginalized poor to express their claims. What 
deserves merit in Young’s focus on narrative is how she sketches 
out possible directions for drawing out voices that have been muted 
by dominant discourses: 
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How can a group that suffers a particular harm or 
oppression move from a situation of total silencing 
and exclusion with respect to this suffering to its 
public expression? Storytelling is often an important 
bridge in such cases between the mute experience of 
being wronged and particular arguments about 
justice. Those who experience the wrong, and 
perhaps some others who sense it, may have no 
language for expressing the suffering as an injustice, 
but nevertheless they can tell stories that relate a 
sense of wrong. 49 
Young’s emphasis on narrative as a mere tool for 
arguments, however, tends to miss out on the rational potential 
that narratives have in their own right. This latter view of narratives 
is the sense in which I want to take up the argument-enabling 
potential of kwentuhan. Kwentuhan enables argumentation because 
first, it helps build a more or less clear sense of the claims one wants 
to raise. Whereas argumentation presupposes that actors are clear 
about what they want and what they are arguing for, narrative 
discourse gives more space for the author to grope through, cohere, 
or negotiate among various, sometimes connected, at times 
conflicting desires. The act of bringing together is the moment of 
agency, where the actor finds herself authoring narratives “to 
reposition his or her self within an ever-changing social milieu.”50 
Second, the dialectical movement of exchanging stories 
can shed light on what narratives are suppressed by the existing 
traditional normative order. This is often made possible through 
the receptivity of a listening silence — a silence that cares. Eric 
Ratliff, a male American ethnographer on the narrative practices of 
Filipino exotic dancers notes how giving time for conversations and 
dialogue with the women has made the latter more comfortable in 
sharing their stories. In the process, they also shared their identities 
as revealed in their desires and aspirations which urged them to 
enter this socially frowned upon job in Philippine society. A crucial 
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achievement of Ratliff here is the precarious balance he was able to 
work out in between being viewed as an intimate friend (a “kuya,” 
which literally means elder brother but is used to refer to male 
friends whom the addressors regard in a brotherly way) and an 
outsider among the circle of the women dancers. Yet from this 
inside/outside position, the women were able to stage through 
narratives unconventional identities suppressed by dominant 
political and socio-economic discourse. 51  
This illustration helps emphasize my point on the 
importance of viewing narrative discourses as a reflexive 
communicative process apart from of argumentation. Narrative 
discourses rests on an affective atmosphere of care and trust. 
Although I agree with Young in saying that narrative discourses 
help in articulating claims in argumentation, I have hesitations 
about merely placing them within procedures that rest on abstract, 
thin solidarity. Narratives are more told in an atmosphere of trust, 
whereas argumentation takes place in a competitive atmosphere.  
The better approach to viewing narrative as a supplement 
to argumentation is in Axel Honneth’s paradigm of care. In this 
approach, the enabling component of narratives lies “before” the 
argumentative procedure, as a mode of communication that 
prepares participants to be more receptive, empathetic, and 
attentive to one another in argumentation processes. The idea here 
is based on Honneth’s point that the “genetically precedent” 
condition for abstract equality is care. Honneth argues that one can 
                                                 
51  Ratliff narrates: “This anthropological account covers establishments 
located along P. Burgos Street in Makati City, Metro Manila, where I conducted 
research in 1995 and then again from 1998 to the present. Rather than following 
a particular line of inquiry, I simply observe people in this space, allowing their 
interactions to unfold without too much interference from my own intellectual 
proclivities. …I have attempted to mitigate my intrusion by refraining from 
structured interviews, engaging instead in informal conversations and periodically 
asking for clarification or elaboration on a topic. …Thus, the statements re-
presented herein largely reflect how women have constructed my identity and 
performative presence according to their familiarity with my motives. I am often 
positioned as an informed and co-operative actor who supports dancers’ narratives 
and performances, so women who know me in this manner are comfortable in 
disclosing their opinions and desires.”  




only find oneself able to treat another person as autonomous and 
equal “if one’s own person has had the experience of unlimited care 
at some time.”52 This is similar to the insight of the Philippine 
historian, Reynaldo Ileto, on the close connections between 
wholeness and freedom in the Filipino language. Freedom means 
kalayaan. The rootword laya (free) is linked with layaw (a condition 
in which one is “pampered like a child). The reference to childhood 
as a “kind of lost Eden” implies a condition of “wholeness” in 
which one was then immersed. Wholeness is experienced as the 
result of care. Ileto highlights the connection between wholeness 
and freedom, layaw and kalayaan, in order to illustrate how the zeal 
of the revolutionaries against the Spaniards was only possible 
because of the memory of a “pre-Spanish condition of wholeness, 
bliss and contentment.”53 What deserves to be underscored here is 
the idea that an important precondition for reflexive and 
revolutionary impulse is the basic experience of care.  Thus, one is 
only able to have a sense of one’s autonomy, understand that all 
possible others can also be autonomous, and be sensitive to the 
violations of individual and collective autonomy through 
experiences or encounters in which one has been cared for.  
 What kwentuhan mode of communication opens up, 
therefore, is a space in which interlocutors experience the basic 
security of care that conditions trust and recognition of one 
another’s equality. Thus the institutionalization of narrative 
discourse as a way of preparing individuals for participation in 
formal justificatory discourses is worth exploring. Habermas has 
said that the institutionalization of discourse or argumentation in 
modern societies allows for an extension of solidarity beyond 
limited contexts, which is a solidarity that is based on the autonomy 
and equality of all.54  If the “voice of the other” is the “central moral 
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phenomenon” of the institutionalization of discourse in modern 
societies,55 then perhaps helping the muted other find its voice back 
must also have a significant part of it.  
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